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Abstract.
This paper introduces a method to estimate the unemployed individual ‘s  marginal
willingness to pay  for the remaining entitlement period by application of search theory. It
is demonstrated that search theory implies that the unemployed individuals’ marginal
willingness to pay the remaining entitlement period must be less than the value of the
unemployment beneBt.  When  benefits exhaust though, the willingness to pay for an
additional period must be equal to the benefit  received during that period. The empirical
relevante of this method is shown by re-interpreting the studies of Meyer (1990) and Katz
and Meyer (1990) .
JEL: H53, J64, J65; Keywords: unemployment duration, unemployment benefits,
marginal willingness to pay,  search theory, nonstationary model.
1. INTRODUCTION
A large number of studies has examined the effect of the leve1 of the unemployment
insurance benefit  on unemployment leaving behaviour (see Atkinson and Micklewright,
1991). Although this effect appears to vary over countries and periods, it emerges that
unemployment benefits generally reduce the probability of leaving unemployment, in
particular in the US.
More recently, studies have focused on the consequences of the length of the
unemployment benefit  period for the unemployed individuals. The length of the
unemployment benefit  period has received considerable  attention by policy makers. It is
generally thought that an extensive benefit  period reduces the incentives of unemployed
individuals to search and to accept job offers. In line with this idea are, empirical  studies
generally fmd that the remaining entitlement period of receiving unemployment insurance
has a negative effect on unemployment leaving behaviour. The probability of leaving
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unemployment rises  sharply just prior to when benefits  exhaust (see, Meyer, 1990; Katz
and Meyer, 1990; Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1993; Carling et al., 1996).
The differences in polities with respect to the length of the unemployment benefït
period are extremely large between countries. In many  European countries, the length of
the unemployment benefït period has been reduced in order to combat high levels of
unemployment and to reduce the expenses on unemployment benetïts sector. This raises
the question what the effects  are of a reduction in the length of the unemployment bene&
period on the welfare of unemployed job seekers. In other words, what is the unemployed
individuals’ willingness to pay for one additional week of benefit?  In this paper 1 wil1
provide  estimates for the unemployed individual’s marginal willingness to pay for the
remaining entitlement period of unemployment insurance (MWP) based on Meyer (1990)
and Katz and Meyer (1990). Thus, this paper shows how the effect of an extension of the
entitlement period on individuals’ welfare can be estimated.
In the current paper, 1 wil1  make use of the studies by Katz and Meyer (1990) and
Meyer (1990) since these two studies include rather  precise  information on the
relationship between the unemployment duration and .the  remaining entitlement period of
receiving unemployment benefit.  The empirical estimates of the unemployment leaving
hazard rates are used to estimate the individual’s value of the remaining entitlement
period of receiving unemployment benefit.’  The obtained estimates are consistent with
the theoretical model: the unemployed individuals’ willingness to pay for a week increase
of the remaining entitlement period is less than the differente  between the weekly
unemployment benefit  received  before and after exhaustion. When benefïts exhaust
though, the willingness to pay for an additional week is approximately equal to this
differente.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two, 1 introduce a search model
acknowledging that unemployment benetïts  are paid for a fïxed  time.  1 derive the
individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for the remaining entitlement period of receiving
unemployment benefït. In section three, the estimation method for the MWP is shortly
’ The studies of Herzog and Schlottmann ( 1990), Gronberg and Reed ( 1994) and Van Ommeren  et al.
(2000) use similar estimation methods and data on job moving behaviour to estimate the willingness to pay
for nonwage  job attributes. Gronberg and Reed (1994) relate these estimation methods to search theory.
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discussed.  The empirical relevante  of the method to estimate the individuals’ value for the
remaining entitlement period is then demonstrated in section  four. Section tïve  concludes
the paper.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 The basic model
The point of departure in this paper is an unemployed individual (see Mortensen, 1977).
Let b denote the unemployment benefit  leve1 paid during an infinitesimal period for an
unemployed person who is qualifíed for unemployment insurance. When unqualifíed, the
person receives unemployment income  bO,  whereas b,  < b. z is the period until bene&
exhaustion. The person searches in the labour market with effort s (s > 0) at a tost  of
k(s,z). Search costs k(s,r)  are increasing and convex in search effort s, hence k’(s,r)  > 0
and k”(s,z)  > 0. The person receives a wage offer at rate a(s,z).  The job arrival rate a(s,z)
is increasing and concave in s, hence a’(s,z)  > 0 and a”(s,‘s)  < 0. Wage offers are drawn
fi-om  a known distribution F(w). Pooling of offers is not allowed: job offers are either
refused or accepted before other offers anive. When.  a job offer is accepted,  employed
persons  may or may not continue searching for another job.
The expected present value of being unemployed with period r remaining until
benefit  exhaustion is denoted as U(z). So, ‘I: is the remaining entitlement period of
receiving unemployment benefít. The future is discounted at rate p. The individual has to
decide the optimal amount of search effort and whether to accept a job offer, taking into
account the expected offers in the future. The individual is assumed to maximise  U. The
value of being unemployed when period r remaining can be written  as the following
differential equation:
U(s, 7) = {b - k(s, 7) - “j: ‘) + a(s,  z)Emax[?V(x),U(s,  z)]
+[l-a(s,r)]U(s,r)}~
l+p’
(1)
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where  W is the value of accepting a job. The expectation is taken with respect to the
distribution of wage offers, x. The term au(s, 4
az
equals the deprecation in U as benefïts
are due to expire at z = 0 (see, similarly, Mortensen, 1986 and Van den Berg, 1990). The
value of unemployment after  benefits  have been exhausted is:
U(s,O)  + {b, - k(s,O)+  a(s,O)E  max[JY(x),  U(s,O)]
+ 11  - a(s,o)u(s90)~&
The individual maximises the value of being unemployed by choosing the optimal search
effort level, s, and the optimal reservation wage, denoted as r. The reservation wage is
defïned as a the minima1 wage that induces  job acceptance. The optimal search effort
leve1 can be obtained by the fïrst-order condition dU / ~3s  = 0 . By noting that -a2U=0
azas  ’
this first-order condition can be written  as:
-~+~Emax[W(xlli(s,r)]  = 0, if SO.
Hence, the marginal search costs equal the marginal expected benefïts of search. In the
case that the first-order condition has no solution for s > 0, then s is 0. Furthermore, it has
been shown many  times  that the reservation wage r is determined by the following
condition (e.g. Mortensen, 1986):
W(r) = U(s, z). (4)
Usually, the optimal choice of s and r depend on the remaining entitlement period ‘t, since
(3) and (4) imply that s = s(U(s,z)) and r = r(U(s,z)). It can be readily shown that the
optimal search effort leve1 increases and the reservation wage decreases as the
unemployed individual approaches benefit  exhaustion (since g > 0). In addition, the
model predicts that the optimal search effort leve1 increases and the reservation wage
decreases sharply just before benefïts  exhaust (since d2U-----CO).
( )dz 2
2.2 Marginal willingness to pay for the remaining entitlement period
In the literature on workers’ search behaviour and marginal willingness to pay for job
attributes, studies have derived the value of job attributes based on their instantaneous
value to the workers (Gronberg and Reed, 1994 and Van Ommeren  et al., 2000). Here, in
contrast, we derive the marginal willingness to pay for the remaining benefit  period based
on the (discounted) present value U. The remaining period z is valuable to the
unemployed individual since it affects  the value of being unemployed in the future. The
derivation of the MWP for the benefit  period is straightforward.
Let US fïrst  focus on the hazard  rate of leaving unemployment e(z). The hazard rate of
leaving unemployment can be written  as:
e(r)  = W(s, ml - ~(W(~,  ml * (5)
Differentiation of 8 with respect to ‘c and b respectively, by application of the chain rule,
and taking the ratio of these derivatives gives US:
ipe dU/dU
ar db-dr  ab’ (6)
Hence, it has been shown that the ratio of the marginal hazard rate of r over the marginal
hazard  of the benefït  equals the ratio of the marginal present value of r over the marginal
present value of the benefït.
The unemployed individuals’ MWP for the remaining entitlement period z is
defïned as the ratio of the marginal present value of being unemployed of the remaining
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entitlement period z over the marginal present value of being unemployed of benefit  b,
since the MWP is defined  as the marginal rate of substitution between the remaining
entitlement period and the leve1 of the current unemployment insurance benefït  ( MWP =
g / g ). By using equation (6),  we obtain:
Hence, 1 have shown that the unemployed individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for the
remaining entitlement period equals the ratio of the marginal hazard rate of z over the
marginal hazard of the benefit.
a2u
It can be easily shown that -
( )ar 2
<OandEarab > 0. The latter  inequality implies
that when the remaining entitlement period reduces, the marginal effect of the bene&
akíwp
becomes smaller. As a consequente,  -
ar
< 0. Hence, in line with intuition, MWP is
decreasing in ‘c and obtains its maximum when the unemployed individual approaches
benefit  exhaustion.
Now suppose that when the remaining period z equals one, the probability of
leaving unemployment before exhaustion can be ignored. In the case that the
unemployment period is measured in weeks, this is a realistic assumption. In this case,
differential equations (1) and (2) render an explicit  solution for U(z)  since PU(Z)  can be
written  as b(1  - expmP’ ) + expePr  b, . This implies that,
m= i-exP-P’  . au(r) =(b-b,)exp-P’ -PT
db and MWP=(b -b,) Pexpp ’ ar 1 - expmp’  *
So, when z equals one, the MWP can be approximated b -b,  , since p is smal1 (e.g. 0.001
as r is measured in weeks). This latter  result  makes sense. In the case that the probability
of leaving unemployment before benefíts exhaust is negligible, the gain in the value of
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being unemployed caused by a marginal increase in the entitlement period is equal to the
differente  between the leve1 of the benefït before and after  exhaustion.
In conclusion, search theory allows US to calculate  the unemployed individuals’
marginal willingness to pay for the remaining entitlement period as the ratio of the
marginal hazard rate  of z over the marginal hazard of the benefit.  Furthermore, under the
assumptions stated, search theory points out that:
1) when z equals one, the MWP is equal to the differente  between the leve1 of
benefíts received  before and after  exhaustion.
2 ) the MWP is decreasing in z.
1 wil1  test for these two implications in section four.
3. ESTIMATION
Empirical hazard models are generally based on the proportional hazard assumption,
which implies that:
where  6, (t) is the baseline  hazard at time  t; zi (t)is  a vector of time  dependent variables
for individual i. zi (t) includes the benefït level, bi,  and a spline that captures the time
remaining T.*  p is a vector of parameters. Hence, Bi, is the additional effect on the hazard
of a marginal increase in the benefïts; PT is the additional effect on the hazard of having
moved a period farther from exhaustion when one is T periods away. Given (7) and (8),  it
appears that:
MWp=P’
Pb
(9)
In consequente,  estimates of pi& can be interpreted as estimates of the marginal
willingness to pay for the remaining entitlement when ‘c periods from exhaustion. In
empirical applications of unemployment leaving behaviour, a common specitïcation  is
that zi (t) includes the logarithm of the benefit  level. In this case:
’ For a discussion of appropriateness of the specifkation see also  Mofflt  (1985) and Katz and Meyer
(1990).
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PMWP=b--
Pb
Hence, the MWP is proportional to the benefit  leve1 at exhaustion.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
In this section,  1 focus on the empirical studies of Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer
(1990) that both examine unemployment leaving behaviour in the US by means  of a
proportional hazard  model. Semiparametric estimation techniques are used to estimate the
models.
1 have chosen to focus on studies for the US, since the method proposed to
estimate the willingness to pay for the remaining entitlement period depends on the
assumption that unemployment leaving behaviour is decreasing in the benefït  level. It has
been generally found that an increase in the benefit  leve1 increases the length of the
unemployment spel1 in the US, but not necessarily in other countries (see Atkinson and
Micklewright, 1991).
Meyer (1990) analyses the Continuous Wage and Benefït  History unemployment
insurance records. Males from twelve states in the U.S. during the period 19781983 are
examined. The advantage of these data is the accurate information on weeks of
unemployment insurance receipt, the levels of the unemployment insurance and the
remaining entitlement period of receiving unemployment benefit.  In addition, it is fairly
large, since it contains 3365 observations. When becoming unemployed, the individual is,
on average, entitled to 34 weeks of benefit  entitlement (with a minimum of 8 and a
maximum of 55 weeks). On average, an unemployed individual receives  benefits  during
13 weeks (with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 39). The average  value includes 985
right censored spells; 201 of these were censored at the exhaustion of benefits.
Unemployment benefits drop to zero when benefïts  exhaust (see Katz and Meyer,
1990). The effects  of unemployment insurance (UI) are measured using functions of the
benefit  leve1 and the time  until benefits  lapse. The logarithm of the weekly UI benefit  and
a spline that captures the time  until benefïts  lapse are included as determinants of the
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hazard rate of leaving unemployment. Since the logarithm of the weekly UI benefit  is
employed, MWP wil1  be calculated using equation (10).
Meyer (1990) defïnes  the spline in time  until exhaustion as follows: the
coefficient on UI 2-5 is the additional effect on the hazard of having  moved 1 week closer
to exhaustion when one is 2-5 weeks away. The coefficient on UI 1 is the additional effect
on the hazard when one moves from 2 to 1 week from exhaustion. Thus, the effect of
moving from 6 weeks away to 1 week is 4 times  the UI 2-5 coeffïcient  plus the UI 1
coefficient. The other UI coefficients have analogous interpretations.
Employing a range of different specifications, Meyer (1990) fïnds  that the
probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefïts lapse
(see Table 1). From 2 to 1 week until exhaustion the hazard almost  doubles.
Cumulatively, the hazard increases at least threefold (in some specitïcations  even
tïvefold)  as one moves fi-om  6 weeks until 1 week until exhaustion. In addition, a 10
percent increase in benefïts is associated with an 8.8 percent decrease in the hazard.
In the current paper, 1 wil1  re-interpret these estimates in order to estimate the
implied MWP.3  The willingness to pay for one additional week is calculated as minus the
willingness to pay for moving one week closer to exhaustion.4  1 have used one-sided-
tests, since the search model indicates  that the marginal willingness to pay for the
remaining entitlement period is positive.
The results imply that the willingness to pay for one additional week entitlement
is 79 dollars, about 76% of the mean benefit  level, when one moves from 2 to 1 week
from exhaustion. When one moves fiom  6 to 2 weeks, the marginal willingness to pay is
22 dollars, about 21% of the mean benefit  level. When one moves from 55 to 41 weeks,
the marginal willingness to pay is 3.42 dollars, about 3% of the mean benefit  level. The
3 1 report here the estimates based on specifïcation (5) in Meyer (1990). The estimates of the MWP based
on other specifications are close to the estimates implied by specifïcation (5).
4 The standard error of the estimates of MWP is derived using the delta method, which requires the
covariance of 13r  and Bt,.  As it is common practice  not to report the covariance of the coeffïcients,  1 report
standard errors presuming tbe  covariance of & and Bt,  is zero. Nevertheless, assuming other values for the
correlation between pr and Bb  are highly inconsequential for the reported precision of the MWP estimates
and does not affect any  of  the conclusions.
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latter  estimate is significant at the 0.05 significante leve1 using a one-sided t-test. The
total value of entitlement (for 55 weeks) is 1.94 times  the mean weekly benefit  level.
The empirical outcomes are plausible and are in line with the theoretical model.
First, the estimated MWP increases sharply as benefit  exhaustion is approached. Second,
the estimated willingness to pay for one additional week entitlement is significantly less
than the benefit  leve1 when the remaining entitlement period is longer  than 2 weeks: the
hypothesis that MWP is less than the current benefit  leve1 when one moves from 6 to 2
weeks from exhaustion is rejected at the 0.001 leve1 (given a point estimate of 21% of the
mean benefit  and a standard error of 9Oh).
Third, the willingness to pay for one additional week entitlement is not
statistically different from the leve1 of benefit  when one moves from 2 to 1 week from
exhaustion at conventional significante levels: given a point estimate of 76% of the mean
benefit  and a standard error of 34%: the hypothesis that the MWP differs from the mean
benefit  leve1 cannot be rejected at the 0.05 significante level. Such a result  is in line with
the theoretical predictions of the search model when unemployment benefits  drop to zero
when benefits exhaust (b,  = 0).
It has been suggested in the literature (see Mortensen, 1977; Tannery, 1983;
Wadsworth, 1991) that the search model introduced  in this paper may not be appropriate,
since the search costs k(s,r)  depend on benefit  b. The argument is that the search model
should acknowledge that search costs consist of search time  and monetary expenses,
which are complementary. One of the implications is that search effort levels may be
increasing in the benefit  leve1 b. This also implies that equation (7) does not hold and,
therefore, the MWP does not equal the differente  between the leve1 of benefïts  received
before and after exhaustion, when r is one. Note however  that the study of Meyer (1990)
does not reject the hypotheses that MWP equals the differente  between the leve1 of
benefïts  received  before and after exhaustion when r is one, which is supportive for the
claim that equation (7) may be used to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for the
remaining entitlement period.
The study of Katz and Meyer (1990) analyses the same data slightly different, but
benetïts  are included in levels (instead of the logarithm of the benefits as in Meyer
1 1
(1990)). As can be seen fi-om  Table 2, the estimates of the MWP are very  similar to those
reported in Table 1.’ The study of Katz and Meyer (1990) suggests  that the point
estimates of the MWP are somewhat higher  when the remaining period is less than 5
weeks (however, these estimates are statistically less different from zero). The week
before benefïts  exhaust, the point estimate of the willingness to pay for the remaining
period is 108.9, which, in line with the search model entitlement, is very  close to the
mean weekly benefít level, which is 104.2. Hence, our conclusions regarding MWP are
invariant to the specifïcation of the effect of the benefit  on the hazard rate.
One of the attractions of the use of the MWP estimates is that it avoids one of the
diffïculties encountered by Katz and Meyer (1990) who show that an extension of the
entitlement period reduces income (the sum of benefïts and wages) of unemployment
insurance recipients due to disincentive effects  of extended benefits  on unemployment
duration. However,  they argue that an extension must in principle  increase  welfare, since
welfare does not only include income but also the utility of the leisure from being
unemployed and the opportunity of obtaining a job offer with higher  eamings. In line with
their arguments, 1 find  estimates which imply that an extension of the entitlement period
increases individuals’ welfare.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, it has been shown that the unemployed individuals’ marginal willingness to
pay for the remaining entitlement period of receiving unemployment benefit  can be
derived from data on unemployment mobility behaviour. The empirical relevante  of this
approach is demonstrated based on empirical studies in the US (Meyer, 1990; Katz and
Meyer, 1990). In line with theory, the unemployed individuals’ willingness to pay for a
week increase of the remaining entitlement period is less than the differente  between the
weekly unemployment benefit  received  before and after exhaustion. When benefits
5 Katz and Meyer (1990) also  give the results of another specifïcation that includes interactions of the
benefït  leve1 and the period until exhaustion. Derivation of the MWP does require then more information
than presented by Katz and Meyer ( 1990).
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exhaust though, the willingness to pay for an additional week is approximately equal to
this differente.
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Table 1. Coefficients of unemployment hazard model estimates with respect to
unemployment attributes, males,  1978-1983, U.S. (based on Meyer, 1990),  and the
MWP for the entitlement period.
variables coeffïcient MWP/mean  benefit MWP
Log weekly UI leve1 -0.8757
(0.2065)
Exhaustion spline:
UI1 0 . 6 6 7 0 76.17 7 9 . 3 6
(0.25 13) (33.67) (35.02)
UI 2-5 0 . 1 8 4 7 2 1 . 0 9 2 1 . 9 4
(0.0634) (8.77) (9 12)
UI 6-10 0 . 0 0 5 2 0 . 5 9 0.61
(0.0336) (3.83) (3.98)
UI 11-25 -0.0102 -1.16 -1.21
(0.0078) (0.91) (0  95)
UI 26-40 0.0015 ,0.17 0.18
(0.0075) (0.85) (0.88)
UI 41-54 0 . 0 2 8 9 3 . 3 0 3.42
(0.0152) (1.86) (1.93)
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. The exhaustion spline variables are explained in the
text. MWP is calculated presuming that the weekly benefït is equal to the mean weekly
benefït level, which is 104.2 (in 1977 dollars).
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Table 2. Coefficients of unemployment hazard model estimates with respect to
unemployment attributes, males,  1978-1983, U.S. (based on Katz and Meyer, 1990),
and the MWP for the entitlement period
Variables coeffícient MWP
Weekly UI leve1 -0.0053
(0.0014)
Exhaustion spline:
UI1 0 . 5 7 7 108.87
(0.249) (55.08)
UI 2-5 0 . 1 6 6 31.32
(0.062) (14.33)
UI 6-10 0.005 0. 94
(0.032) (6.02)
UI 11-25 -0.006 -1.03
(0.007) (1.21)
UI 26-40 0 . 0 0 6 1.03
(0.007) (1.21)
UI 41-54 0.021 3.96
(0.138) (26.02)
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. The exhaustion spline variables are explained in the
text.
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